Money and monetary policy: an essay in honor of Darryl Francis by Allan H. Meltzer
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
JULY/AUGUST 2001      23
Money and Monetary
Policy: An Essay in
Honor of Darryl Francis
Allan H. Meltzer
I
t is a pleasure to take part in a conference
honoring Darryl Francis. Recognition of his
courage and leadership is long overdue. Darryl
took a leadership role by encouraging the St. Louis
monetarist tradition, when it was scorned and
derided, by pointing to the need for more restrictive
monetary policy in the late 1960s, and in continu-
ing to make the case for lower inflation during his
service on the open market committee and as
President of the St. Louis Bank.
The 1960s and 1970s were the Keynesian
decades in U.S. economic policy. Keynesian policy
views were mainstream views in the academic
profession. The Council of Economic Advisers then
had a more prominent role in economic policy than
it has now. The chairmen of the Council in the 1960s
were Walter Heller, Gardner Ackley, and Arthur Okun,
all leading Keynesian economists. In the 1970s, the
roster includes Paul McCracken, Herbert Stein, and
Alan Greenspan, three conservative Keynesians at
the time, but Keynesians nonetheless. They were
followed by Charles Schultze in the late 1970s.
The primary role of fiscal policy in economic
stabilization was a distinguishing characteristic of
Keynesian policy. I recall the fervor with which
senior professors, young faculty, and bright gradu-
ate students sought to overturn Friedman and
Meiselman’s (1963) demonstration that, except for
the Great Depression, monetary velocity was more
stable than the Keynesian investment multiplier.
Similar fervor greeted Andersen and Jordan’s (1968)
paper showing that changes in money had stronger
and more reliable effects than budget expenditures
on changes in nominal gross national product (GNP).
As late as Jerome Stein’s (1976) conference volume
on monetarism, these issues remained highly con-
tentious and hotly debated.
At the height of the controversy in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, Darryl Francis was the principal,
and usually the only, spokesman who challenged
this orthodoxy at meetings of the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC). At the time, I was aware
of Darryl’s role, but I appreciate it even more now
that I have access to the FOMC’s minutes for that
period. I will soon give some examples suggesting
that, if Darryl’s advice had been taken, we would
have avoided the great inflation.
The role of money in monetary policy remains
an issue. The Federal Reserve recently gave up the
publication of money growth estimates or targets
when requirements to publish their estimates
expired. The mistake occurred much earlier, when
the FOMC stopped using money growth as a mea-
sure of the thrust of monetary policy.
Federal Reserve history suggests that neglect
of money growth is a major mistake. The Federal
Reserve would have avoided mistakes such as the
Great Depression and the Great Inflation if it had
used money growth as an indicator of the thrust
of monetary policy. Below I present some other
examples and contrast the role assigned to money
growth by the European Central Bank with its
neglect by the Federal Reserve.
BEGINNING THE GREAT INFLATION,
1966-69
From the trough of the 1960-61 recession in
February 1961 to the end of 1965, the monetary
base accelerated steadily. Annual base growth rose
from 2.9 percent to 6 percent. Annual rates of con-
sumer price index (CPI) inflation followed slowly,
rising from 0.67 percent in 1961 to 1.9 percent in
1965. The quarterly average rate, however, reached
3.8 percent (annualized) in fourth quarter 1965,
and the GNP deflator rose more than 4 percent in
the first half of 1966.
The Federal Reserve responded to the 4 percent
inflation by raising interest rates. Money growth fell.
Data available at the time show average M1 growth
falling from a maintained rate of 4.4 percent to zero
for the second and third quarters of 1966.1 Short-
term interest rates rose above 5 percent, the highest
levels in the postwar period to that time, indeed
the highest levels since the early 1930s.
The economy slowed. Real GNP growth fell from
9 percent in fourth quarter 1965 to less than 2 per-
cent a year later. The inflation rate fell also. Within
a few months, the annual rate of inflation was back
1 Contemporary data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(1972).
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to 2.5 percent. Federal Reserve action reduced the
rate of inflation quickly. At the time, the Federal
Reserve had considerable credibility. In the 15 years
since it had regained independence from the admin-
istration, inflation averaged 2 percent and real
growth averaged 3.6 percent despite recessions in
1953-54, 1957-58, and 1960-61. The United States
had not experienced such good times since the
much shorter period of growth and low inflation in
the 1920s. William McChesney Martin, Chairman
of the Federal Reserve, was not quite the popular
figure that Alan Greenspan has become, but he
was highly regarded and respected as a defender
of price stability.
The good news was about to end in 1966. As
we know now, productivity growth reached a peak
at about this time and, except for brief periods,
inflation rates have not maintained an average rate
of 2 percent or less. Indeed, the goal of price stabil-
ity has been replaced by a current goal of 2 to 3
percent inflation. 
Darryl Francis became President at St. Louis in
1966, just as inflation began to rise. Contemporary
data show that the CPI inflation rate reached 4.7
percent by late 1967 and more than 6 percent by
early 1969. Current data lower these inflation rates
to 3.25 percent and 5 percent. The Federal Reserve
based decisions and actions on contemporary data,
however.
As usual, the Federal Reserve ignored money
growth. Facing a recession brought on by the “high”
interest rate policy, it reversed its course decisively
in 1967. Contemporary data show average M1
growth at 7 percent for the years 1967-68 with
inflation at almost 5 percent.
President Johnson, under pressure because his
budget deficit financed both an increasingly un-
popular war and substantial redistribution, proposed
a temporary 10 percent surtax on incomes. This was
a fiscal solution to a monetary problem. It could
work only if, with a small deficit, the Federal Reserve
maintained interest rates and allowed money
growth to slow. Keynesian commentary urged the
opposite—lower interest rates to offset the tax sur-
charge. In fact, the monetary base accelerated and,
as noted, M1 growth remained about 7 percent.
Excerpts from the FOMC minutes for 1967 and
1968 show that President Francis, usually alone,
opposed Federal Reserve policy. His remarks suggest
awareness that reducing inflation had a temporary,
but real, social cost. He favored fiscal action to
reduce the budget deficit but, unlike many of his
contemporaries, he did not support the Keynesian
approach of easing monetary policy by lowering
interest rates and increasing money growth to mod-
erate the contractive effects of higher tax rates. He
wanted to reduce money growth, then maintain it
at a rate consistent with price stability.
Here are some samples drawn from the FOMC
minutes.2 In May 1967, with GNP growth down to
1.5 percent, Francis told his FOMC colleagues:
It appeared that the deceleration of econ-
omic activity had been halted, and that
growth would soon be resumed. The increas-
ing budget deficit of the Federal Government
was providing a growing stimulus…
Monetary actions had been very expansion-
ary since early this year, and the response
in the real sectors of the economy appeared
to have been relatively quick. Since mone-
tary and fiscal developments usually had
their chief impact after some lag, the basic
present problem was not how to achieve
adequate total demand but how to avoid
excessive demand…[E]xcessive inflation
was likely to appear later in the year unless
monetary actions were moderated now.
(FOMC, 1967, pp. 567-69)
Francis concluded by urging a money growth rate
of 2 to 4 percent instead of the staff’s projected rate
of 8 to 11 percent.
Chairman Martin “noted that the Committee
was not unanimous…with Mr. Francis favoring
some firming of money market conditions and the
remaining eleven members favoring the mainte-
nance of prevailing conditions” (ibid., p. 573). The
Federal Reserve kept the interest rate unchanged.
Reported M1 growth reached a 9.7 percent annual
rate in that quarter.
In September 1967, a majority of the FOMC
favored a modest and cautious increase in interest
rates. Francis, joined by two others, dissented. He
favored a more aggressive change in the federal
funds rate and free reserves. Citing the 9 percent
reported growth of M1 and personal income for
the most recent six months, he warned the FOMC
that current policy “would feed and extend the
imminent excessive demand and price inflation”
(ibid., p. 973).
Three weeks later, Francis argued that any in-
2 The quotations are from the FOMC minutes, which are edited; thus,
the statements quoted here may not be exactly the same as the state-
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crease in interest rates would be temporary, a nec-
essary adjustment to slow inflation and aggregate
demand. Congress had not enacted the President’s
tax increase. He said that the need for monetary
restraint was urgent.
Contemporary reports show inflation slowing
in the fourth quarter. Several members of the FOMC
agreed with Francis that interest rates should be
increased to curb the effects of fiscal and monetary
stimulus on aggregate demand. They believed, how-
ever, the time was not right; the Treasury would
soon have to sell bonds.
Francis argued against delay. “[T]his was a per-
nicious doctrine…[W]hen the Federal budget was
excessively stimulative…monetary actions were
also excessively stimulative” (ibid., p. 1165).
So it went. Francis encountered one excuse after
another. In December 1967, the FOMC discussed
selective credit controls as an alternative to higher
interest rates and slower money growth. Late in
1967, the Board increased reserve requirement
ratios. With interest rates unchanged, however, it
supplied the reserves in the open market that it had
removed by regulation. Francis made this point at
the February 1968 meeting. He urged “an immediate
and substantial move toward monetary restraint”
(FOMC, 1968, p. 153). Monetary base growth in-
creased to 6 percent or more. In April 1968, Francis
argued against those who opposed restraint because
of its selective effects on housing. This argument
against restraint had political force because higher
market interest rates would require an increase in
ceiling rates on time deposits under Regulation Q.
The thrift industry opposed the increase.
At the March 1968 meeting, Francis lost his vote
on the FOMC as part of the annual rotation. He
continued to argue forcefully for monetary restraint
and to urge the administration to reduce the bud-
get deficit. Throughout 1968, joined by Governor
Sherman Maisel, he urged more attention to growth
of the monetary aggregates. He complained fre-
quently that the Manager of the System Open Market
Account did not respond adequately to the proviso
clause in the directive that called for restraint when
growth of credit exceeded a specified rate.
The FOMC did not respond to these arguments
and did not act. Money growth remained excessive,
and inflation continued to rise. Contemporaneous
reports show quarterly average CPI inflation above
5 percent in the last half of 1968.
When, at last, Congress agreed in June 1968 to
a tax surcharge, some members of the FOMC wanted
to reduce discount rates and ease policy. St. Louis
estimated that the full employment budget would
shift from a $14 billion deficit in the first half of
1968 to a $10 billion surplus in the first half of 1969.
In August 1968, Francis told the FOMC that he did
not agree with analysts “preoccupied with fear of a
coming recession…[and that] in his judgment, the
view that the recently adopted fiscal package would,
by itself, adequately restrict total demand and cure
the inflationary problems was overly optimistic.
Monetary actions had continued to be excessively
stimulative, negating the desirable anti-inflationary
impact of the fiscal package” (ibid., p. 991).
The St. Louis view was that increased money
growth would dominate the effect of the tax sur-
charge. The St. Louis staff forecast increased nominal
GNP growth. Contemporary data suggest that growth
rates of nominal and real GNP and industrial pro-
duction slowed in the second half of 1968. The
inflation rate did not fall, however.
In 1969, the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank
proposed increases in the discount rate on six
occasions between January and July. The Board
initially opposed any increase. At first, St. Louis
asked for a 0.5 percent increase to 6 percent. Opp-
onents of the increase gave different reasons.
Some Governors wanted to wait until the Treasury
completed its financing. Governor Mitchell did not
care for 0.5 point increases. He preferred to limit
the availability of credit, although he did not say
how that could be done without raising interest
rates. Governor Brimmer thought that credit
expansion resulted from the actions of a few large
banks that borrowed Euro-dollars.
By late March, Richmond and Kansas City joined
St. Louis in asking for a 0.5 percent increase to 6 per-
cent. Chicago asked for 6.5 percent. Dallas favored
an increase also. On April 3, the Board approved the
6 percent rate. Eight weeks later, St. Louis requested
an additional 1 percent increase. It renewed the
request several times, through late June. By that
time, M1 growth had fallen to a 3 percent annual
rate. St. Louis, guided by money growth, stopped
requesting rate increases. Throughout the summer,
Chicago continued to ask for a 7 percent rate. By
November, the economy was in recession.
The rest of the story is familiar. By 1971, mone-
tary base growth reached an 8 percent annual rate.
The Bretton Woods System ended. Controls reduced
the measured rate of inflation, but base money
growth increased to 9 percent by 1973. With con-
trols removed, measured CPI inflation reached 726 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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percent before the first oil shock and more than 11
percent shortly after.
Darryl Francis had the good sense to rely on the
strong research group at St. Louis led by Homer Jones
and including Jerry Jordan and Leonall Andersen.
Darryl encouraged and supported the group, used
their analyses, and articulated a strong position of
which he can be proud. His views were unpopular,
but with hindsight he knows that he was right.
If the FOMC had acted on his recommendations,
the United States and much of the rest of the world
would have avoided the worst of the Great Inflation.
The Bretton Woods System may not have survived,
but it would have lasted longer. The relative price
of oil would not have fallen precipitately after the
U.S. devaluation, so the oil shock might have been
avoided, with positive consequences for productiv-
ity growth in the developed countries. With greater
certainty, inflation, disinflation, and regulation
would not have destroyed the thrift industry. Per-
haps, also, there would have been fewer petrodollars
to recycle, less bank lending to Latin America, and
no debt crisis in the 1980s.
START OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION,
ANOTHER EXAMPLE
Everyone is familiar with the fact that mistaken
Federal Reserve policies prolonged and deepened
the Great Depression. Attention to money growth
would have alerted the Open Market Policy Com-
mittee (OMPC) to the severity of deflationary policy.
I believe it is now generally accepted that a reces-
sion would likely have occurred in 1929, but the
Great Depression could have been avoided.
Not only did the Federal Reserve ignore money
growth, but its leading official did not know that
demand deposits were the major component of the
money stock. Darryl was not there to correct the
errors, but Irving Fisher was. Fisher told of his visit
to Eugene Meyer, Governor of the Federal Reserve
Board, in 1931. Fisher told Meyer that demand
deposits adjusted had fallen sharply. Meyer asked
what they were. According to Fisher, a clerk brought
in the ledger. Meyer observed the figures on the
page, but he showed little interest and took no
expansive action.
The two years before October 1929 are an-
other example of policy error caused by failure to
consider money growth as a measure of the thrust
of monetary policy. The United States was on the
gold standard, but it did not follow gold standard
rules. Gold flows were frequently sterilized. Growth
of credit and member bank borrowing were the
main guides for policy. The Federal Reserve’s prin-
cipal concerns were the rise in stock prices and the
use of credit in the stock market.
The rise in stock prices that ended in 1929 is
extraordinary by almost any standard except the
most recent. From the end of 1924 to September
1929, Standard and Poor’s index rose at a 21 percent
compound annual rate. The Dow Jones industrial
average, at its peak of 381 in September 1929, had
doubled in less than two years. The rise was pro-
pelled, in part, by rising profits and economic activ-
ity. Real GNP and corporate profits rose at annual
rates of 4 percent and 12 percent, respectively, with
only one mild recession during the nearly five-year
period. The increase in market capitalization, rela-
tive to nominal GNP, brought the ratio of the two to
a level that was not surpassed until 1996.
The rate of rise in corporate profits was much
greater than the rate of increase in GNP, but only
half the rate of increase in the value of traded stocks
(market capitalization). Between 1925 and 1929 the
ratio of market capitalization to corporate profits
doubled. In absolute value, the ratio rose from 25
in 1925 to 50 at its peak in 1929.
For those brought up on the belief that the
1929 stock market was a wild speculative orgy, the
data are surprising. The capitalization ratio rose
most rapidly in 1926, with rising profit anticipa-
tions. The ratio then remained between 40 and 50
until the market break in 1929. These data suggest
that the so-called speculative boom of 1927-29 was
driven by rising profits and, most likely, by antici-
pations of further increases to come. The 17 percent
decline in corporate profits in fourth quarter 1929
and the 30 percent decline in first quarter 1930, or
anticipation of the decline, must have reversed some
of the beliefs built up during the expansion. At the
time, many could recall vividly the volatility of the
late nineteenth century and the frequent banking
panics that Congress intended the Federal Reserve
to prevent. Call money rates briefly reached 20 per-
cent in 1929. Rates of 100 percent or more had not
occurred in the 15 years of the Federal Reserve’s
existence. There had been recessions, but the only
major deflation, in 1921, was attributed universally
to the end of wartime excesses. The belief spread
that the Federal Reserve had learned how to main-
tain prosperity, dampen recessions, and prevent
inflation. The return of many countries to the gold
standard by 1927 reinforced the view that the worldFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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economy was on a stable foundation and that infla-
tion and deflation were unlikely to occur.
Irving Fisher commented that the stock market
“went up principally because of sound, justified
expectations of earnings, and only partly because
of unreasoning and unintelligent mania for buying”
(Fisher, 1930, p. 53). He credited increased profits
to the application of science, technology, and new
management methods.
Annual rates of CPI inflation remained negative
from July 1926 to May 1929. Restoration of the
international gold standard and Federal Reserve
actions were a main reason for the sustained, mild
deflation of the period. The 12-month moving aver-
age of monetary base growth fell below 1 percent
in November 1926, turned negative in May 1928,
and remained negative through June 1929. In this
period of rapid economic growth, monetary policy
was deflationary.
The Federal Reserve gave no attention to the
monetary base. Its records show, however, that the
1929 increase in output and fall in prices was known
at the time. The U.S. economy had a spectacular
performance in the first half of the year. Corporate
earnings increased about 30 percent in the first nine
months. “Large corporate earnings, together with
the ability of corporations to float stocks at high
[stock] prices…put them in possession of funds
with which to complete contemplated expansion
programs” (“Review of Business in 1929,” Federal
Reserve Board; January 15, 1930, preliminary, Box
2461, p. 4). The only negative influence reported at
the time was a decline in residential structures.
Industrial and commercial building was at a record
level. Exports of manufactured goods increased 50
percent for the year, despite the recession in the
last four months (ibid., p. 2).
These data suggest that, as Fisher said, the opti-
mistic projections underlying the rise in stock prices
had a factual base. Even after the severe decline at
the end of 1929, the Board’s staff described the
first six months of 1929 as “the continuation of the
steady expansion throughout the year 1928” (ibid.,
p. 5). Industrial production was recorded as 26 per-
cent above the trough of the 1927 recession.
Some questioned or dissented from these opti-
mistic beliefs. Allyn Young, a respected economist
of the period, warned about deflation early in 1929.
Unlike many of his contemporaries, who blamed
deflation on either a decline in the gold stock or a
maldistribution of gold holdings, Young blamed cen-
tral bank gold hoarding. He saw that central bank
policies forced deflation.
Restoration of the gold standard increased
demand for monetary gold stocks. The effect was
deflationary for the world economy. The principal
creditor countries, France and the United States,
increased deflationary pressure by sterilizing gold
inflows. France had returned to the gold standard
at an exchange rate that undervalued the franc,
and Britain at an exchange rate that overvalued the
pound. After the French stabilization in 1927, capi-
tal returned to France, followed by gold. Much of
the flow came from Britain.
The French government disliked the gold
exchange standard. It chose to hold gold, not foreign
exchange—a policy it repeated in the 1960s. It sold
foreign exchange and bought gold to shift the bal-
ance in its reserves. These operations reduced
French money growth and prevented the rise in
prices needed to adjust for the franc’s devaluation.
The United States had a gold outflow in 1928, an
inflow in the first three quarters of 1929. It, too,
sterilized most of the gold flows; as noted earlier,
the monetary base declined.
U.S. and French policy, therefore, shifted the
adjustment burden to the deficit countries. These
countries had to deflate or devalue to adjust their
real exchange rates. By 1931, Britain, the Scandinav-
ian countries, and many others chose devaluation
over continued deflation.
The Federal Reserve ignored the monetary
base and money. It focused its attention on the
stock market, credit, interest rates, and member
bank borrowing. Although aware that the price
level had fallen and continued to fall, its concern
was inflation, not deflation.
The basis of this concern was the real bills doc-
trine. Under that doctrine, credit to hold real estate,
government debt, and common stocks was “specu-
lative” credit. Such credit permitted wealth owners
to hold assets but did not increase the production
of goods. According to this doctrine, because credit
increased more than output, prices had to rise. Real
bills, unlike speculative credit, finance additions to
output. Because stock market prices, member bank
borrowing, and credit had increased, credit expan-
sion had financed speculation; inflation must result.
The Board’s solution was to restrict credit to
the stock market by direct pressure and exhortation.
The Board did not want to increase the discount
rate because that would penalize legitimate borrow-
ers, the suppliers of real bills. Speculative borrowing28 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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would be encouraged; speculators would continue
to borrow because the rate of increase in share
prices made them insensitive to small changes in
interest rates. That was the reasoning.
Benjamin Strong, Governor of the New York
Reserve Bank, was ill in 1928 and died in the
autumn. Officials at the New York Bank had been
trained by Strong. Strong rejected the notion that
the Reserve Banks could control the quality or
types of credit that financial institutions granted.
He and his followers believed that banks borrowed
from the Federal Reserve only in case of need and
with reluctance. Increased borrowing at a higher
rate would induce banks to contract credit, so they
could reduce borrowed reserves. Although increased
aggregate borrowing supplied reserves, and this
supported more lending, the New York Reserve Bank
believed that it would have the opposite effect. In
their view, discount rate increases reinforced the
effect of reluctance to borrow.
The hot dispute between Washington and New
York in 1929 was not about whether monetary
contraction was desirable. Although the price level
was falling, they agreed about the threat of inflation.
They disagreed about how to achieve monetary con-
traction. If they had paid attention to the monetary
base, or followed gold standard rules, they would
have allowed money and credit to increase, reducing
interest rates and deflation in other countries.
For this policy to succeed fully, France would
have had to agree. At the time, they received and
sterilized more gold than the United States.
By the spring of 1929, it was probably too late
to stop a worldwide recession, although not too
late to stop the severe deflation that followed. The
National Bureau of Economic Research marked a
cycle peak in April for Germany and July for Britain.
March was the peak month for production in
Belgium; Canada’s peak came in the spring. By fall,
financial and business failures had increased in
Britain, Germany, and elsewhere (Kindleberger,
1986, pp. 102-04). The Federal Reserve’s production
index, available at the time, peaked in June. By
October, it was 8 percent below the peak. Monthly
peaks in the stock markets in the United States,
Canada, and France came in September 1929; but
markets in Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland
reached peaks in 1928; and in Britain the peak came
in January 1929 (Kindleberger, 1986, pp. 110-11,
based on League of Nations data).
The Great Depression had begun.
THE ECB AND THE FED
Money has a central role in the framework that
the European Central Bank (ECB) uses to link policy
actions to their ultimate goal, low inflation. In a
recent monograph describing the ECB’s strategy
and processes, the senior economics staff of the
ECB wrote:
The central message from the [monetary]
theory, confirmed by the evidence, of a
strong link between money and prices,
cannot be ignored by a central bank that
has price stability as its primary goal. This
relationship is a reminder that it is impossi-
ble to have high and sustained inflation
without monetary accommodation. Since
the relationship holds in the long term, there
are obvious difficulties to interpret the im-
pact of current monetary developments on
inflation in the medium term. Concluding,
from the acknowledgement of these difficul-
ties, that money should be neglected alto-
gether is, however, a logical non sequitur.
Ignoring money amounts to disregarding
an important piece of information. This
information is particularly useful to avoid
large mistakes in policy, which could arise
when the other available indicators—
whose exact relationship with inflation is
unknown both in the short and in the long
run—fail to signal inflationary risks.
(Angeloni et al., 2000, p. 59)
This statement properly emphasizes two central
propositions. First, our knowledge of the short- or
medium-term linkage between money and prices
is imperfect. U.S. experience in the early 1980s,
when money growth gave a series of misleading
signals, supports the ECB’s interpretation. Second,
the long-run relation between money and prices is
one of the best-established propositions in econ-
omics. Prices may change without money chang-
ing, but sustained inflation cannot occur without
sustained money growth.
The ECB monograph recognizes that money
growth is not a very reliable predictor of short-
term changes in prices or nominal gross domestic
product. This should not come as a surprise to Darryl
Francis or the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. The
Andersen-Jordan (1968) equation showed that the
response of nominal GNP to money builds up slowly.
Evidence suggests that the initial effects of a changeFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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in the monetary base are absorbed almost entirely
by an opposite change in base velocity. There is lit-
tle or no immediate effect.
One reason for the delayed response is that
central banks do not pay attention to short-term
changes in money. The most useful hypothesis for
the market to use under these circumstances is
that short-term changes in money growth are
mainly random changes. Base money growth is a
noisy series, so it is difficult to extract any useful
information from its short-term movements.
The ECB senior staff reaches a similar conclu-
sion. It finds little useful information in short-term
changes in money. It adopts a “reference value” of
money that the staff believes is “consistent with—
and will serve to achieve—price stability” (ibid., p.
62). The reference value is the best available forecast
of the future growth of money that is consistent
with price stability.
The ECB and Federal Reserve procedures differ
in several ways. Most striking is the determined
attempt by the ECB staff to set out the medium- to
long-term framework that guides its actions. It has
a long-term objective, price stability, and the outline
of a strategy to achieve that objective. The objective
is given by law; it is not free to change objectives.
Although it takes account of the social cost of
achieving price stability, the law does not require it
to do so. In principle, it could force the member
countries to accept high unemployment to reduce
inflation. If it acted that way, however, the law set-
ting its objective would likely change.
The Federal Reserve has a much less clear objec-
tive. It claims that price stability is its objective, but
there are few times in its almost 90-year history
that the nation experienced sustained high employ-
ment and low or moderate inflation. Although the
last decade is one of the most successful decades
in its history, there is as yet no reason to believe
that the mixture of wise decisions and good luck
will be sustained.
The reason for skepticism is a strong prior
belief that is reinforced by my study of Federal
Reserve history. The main policy errors of the past
were not made by evil men who wanted to create
depression or inflation. They were made by officials
who believed that money growth was not a useful
indicator of future inflation or deflation. Some of
the theory or theories on which these officials relied
had no place for money. They did not accept, and
in many cases rejected explicitly, the proposition
that money growth is relevant for inflation or defla-
tion. They paid no attention to money growth.
In the 1920s and early 1930s the most popular
theory of money was the real bills doctrine. In the
1950s and 1960s, a simple Keynesian model held
the dominant position. The main policy implications
of these models highlighted the role of interest rates
or borrowing, not money. In the earlier period, the
Board dismissed as curious the work and recom-
mendations of Irving Fisher, and in the later period,
of Milton Friedman, the St. Louis bank, and other
monetarists. Currently, the staff’s econometric
model has no separate role for money. The quan-
tity of money is determined endogenously. Money
growth has no independent role in determining
inflation.
This error permeates the staff and, apparently
many of the policymakers as well. I believe a main
reason for neglecting money now, and for many
years, is the Federal Reserve’s intense concentration
on near-term events. The Federal Reserve does not
have a meaningful long-term strategy. At least, it
has not made its strategy explicit.
Of course, one can find many words written
and spoken about the medium-term, the need to
control inflation a year or two ahead, or the small
effect of current actions on near-term outcomes.
I find it hard to connect these statements to the
actions that the Federal Reserve takes, the way it
decides to take action, and the messages it sends to
the financial markets and others.
The latter message concentrates on short-term
changes in principal variables. Many of these data
have large reporting errors and are subject to major
changes between original announcement and
final revision. In an interesting paper, Athanasios
Orphanides (2000) showed great differences be-
tween the fit of John Taylor’s well-known rule when
based on initially available data and the later data
that appear in the record books. This is one of many
examples showing that much of the data used for
policy decision is subject to major revisions that can
change interpretations.
One cannot rationally object to using new infor-
mation, if it has content. At issue is the relative
weight placed on such data. The Federal Reserve
gives lip service to longer-term goals but focuses
most attention on short-term changes about which
it can do little or nothing. Although it recognizes
this point verbally, it has not changed its behavior.
A recent paper by Edward Nelson (2000) revisits
the role of money in the United States and the
United Kingdom. He finds that, for the period
from 1961 to 1999 in the United States, lagged30 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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growth of real base money balances has a strong,
significant effect on a measure of the deviation of
output from its long-term trend. The effect of
money growth remains powerful when the sample
includes only the period from 1982 to 1999. Nelson
includes the real value of the federal funds rate. As
he notes, the significant effects of money, given the
interest rate, imply that there are effects of money
beyond those given by the interest rate. Nelson
(2000) estimates a similar equation for the United
Kingdom. Again, there are strong, persistent effects
of real money growth on the output gap, holding
real interest rates constant.
The transmission of monetary policy from
initial impulse to final effect involves changes in
many relative prices of assets and output. That last
statement may seem obvious to many of you, but it
is inconsistent with most, if not all, recent work on
quarterly dynamic models of monetary policy.
Nelson (2000) introduces base money growth
into a small, dynamic optimizing model. He assumes
that there are costs of adjusting portfolios. His
empirical work shows strong effects of money
growth, holding the interest rate constant. These
findings supplement and reinforce the conclusion
drawn from historical episodes (Meltzer, 2000).
The Federal Reserve’s recent decision to ignore
money is a mistake. The primary reason for this
mistake, and for the difference between the ECB on
this issue is, I believe, the excessive emphasis that
the Federal Reserve gives to short-term changes.
I have raised the last point several times. Let
me develop it further. Every week the government
announces new statistics on the economy. Many
of these announcements are poor approximations
of the data that are later corrected. The daily and
weekly commentary speculates on whether the
last announcement changes the probability that
the Federal Reserve will change interest rates. Mar-
kets react. Asset prices move. The next announce-
ment may augment or reverse today’s changes.
The weight that each announcement receives
depends much less on the quality of the data than
on market commentators and participants beliefs
about the weight that the Federal Reserve puts on
the announcement. The Chairman and other offi-
cials give hints and clues about what they watch.
These weights shift frequently, and they are not
uniform across the members of the FOMC. If there
is a hypothesis relating these noisy indicators to
long-term objectives, it has never been stated or
evaluated.
These criticisms may seem odd, coming as they
do in the nineteenth year of a remarkable expansion
punctuated by only one mild recession a decade
ago. The Federal Reserve deserves and gets much
credit for this unique period in U.S. economic his-
tory. Its actions reduced inflation in the early 1980s.
It responded to the 1990-91 recession without re-
newing inflation. In 1998-99, it responded to the
Asian crisis by financing a domestic boom that
permitted the world economy to export to us and,
thus, recover. The cost was a rise in U.S. inflation.
These triumphs of judgment over rules and
models—and that is what they appear to be—go
some way to balance the ledger against the mistakes
of the past. A student of monetary history who
knows something about probability theory has to
recognize that recent successes are, in their way,
remarkable. Judgment has been excellent and has
produced an excellent record. This general feeling
of success is aided by the current popular belief
that 2 to 3 percent inflation is acceptable, even
desirable.
I will close with three observations. First, the
FOMC watches many different indicators that guide
changes in the federal funds rate. By chance these
may give signals that do not differ very much from
the signals given by money growth. Let me offer
some examples to suggest that a rule-based strategy
relying on money growth would have produced
similar results in recent years.
The Shadow Open Market Committee (SOMC)
supported the FOMC’s gradual policy in 1991-92,
when many critics wanted more expansion. The
SOMC argued that steady gradual monetary expan-
sion would avoid a surge in aggregate demand and
rising inflation and, thus, prolong the expansion. It
did not favor more restrictive policy until the fall of
1993, when the monetary base growth rose. The
Federal Reserve acted in the winter of 1994, less
than six months later.
The SOMC did not join the Phillips curve
watchers who warned about the threat of rising
inflation in 1996-97. Base money growth remained
moderate. The SOMC omitted its September 1997
meeting because it approved of policy at the time.
The SOMC did not begin to complain about exces-
sive money growth until March and September
1998. The Federal Reserve was slower to move this
time, perhaps because there was no sign of inflation.
When the Federal Reserve moved in mid-1999, it
moved in a series of decisive steps.
At present, base money growth does not seem
excessive. The Federal Reserve has stopped raisingFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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interest rates, at least for the time being. This is again
consistent with growth of the monetary base and
other aggregates.
Second, the FOMC in the 1990s differs in an
important respect from earlier FOMCs. It gives the
markets and the public much more information
about its changing policy guides. Markets use this
information and, at times, move in advance of
Federal Reserve action. This has been true especially
since the FOMC surprised the markets in 1994.
Third, and last, a warning from history. The
Federal Reserve had a good record in the 1920s.
Benjamin Strong, the dominant member of the
committee that decided on open market purchases
and sales, was highly praised, then and later, for
his astute judgments and decisive actions. Irving
Fisher wanted Congress to enact a rule mandating
price stability. Congress held hearings in 1922, 1926,
and 1928. The Federal Reserve opposed the rule, and
it was never adopted. Had the rule been followed,
it would have avoided the deflation and the worst
of the depression. It would have worked when
nominal interest rates gave misleading signals.
Fisher talked to Strong about Strong’s opposition
to his rule. According to Fisher, in a private conver-
sation, Strong replied: “If you will let me alone, I
will try to do the best I can, but if you make me do
by law what I am trying to do without legislative
control, I will be so afraid that I cannot fill the bill
that I will not accept the responsibility” (Fisher,
1946, p. 3).
Fisher responded: “I will trust you as long as
you live but you will not live forever and when you
die I fear your policies will die with you.” Strong
replied: “I have trained my assistants so that they
know these policies and they will be continued”
(ibid., p. 3; see also Hetzel, 1985, p. 8).
Strong died soon after. The rest of the story is
history. We should not repeat that history even
partially.
Both theory and evidence suggest that the inter-
est rate, at times, has been a misleading indicator
when money growth gave a correct signal. Darryl
Francis’s tenure was one of those times. Fortunately,
he recognized the error. Unfortunately for us, and
much of the rest of the world, his colleagues did not.
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